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Introduction
The European Union (EU) has long embarked on a 'radical experiment' with open, internal borders for its citizens and conditioned access to cross-border welfare for those on the move (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou, 2016: 222) . Across the globe, states tend to carefully guard their borders, residence rights and access to their welfare schemes. A trade-off between countries' openness to admitting immigrants and the rights granted to immigrants after admission has been identified (Ruhs, 2013) . The international trend is that openness comes with a price in the sense that states with more liberal immigration policies are more restrictive regarding access to rights, including social rights (Ruhs, 2013) . Here, EU rules contrast sharply. The EU has for decades moved in the opposite direction and institutionalized a logic of opening. In particular, EU citizens' entitlement to become members of the welfare community of another member state is rather exceptional, as welfare states otherwise rely on a profound logic of closure (Ferrera, 2005; Heindlmaier and Blauberger, 2017; Martinsen and Vollaard, 2014; ) .
The viability of this exceptionalism is questioned, however, and its implications for the welfare state discussed. Political concerns of welfare states' sustainability in a community where Union citizens can move and reside freely have been loudly expressed (Hemerijck, 2013; Heindlmaier and Blauberger, 2017; Hjorth, 2016; Kvist, 2004 . Concerns that EU immigrants 'take out' more than they 'put in' are increasingly voiced (Dustmann et al., 2010: 2; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014: 628; Ruist, 2014) . In particular, such concerns were voiced in relation to the grand EU enlargement of 2004, where eight Central and Eastern European states 1 became members (Dustmann et al., 2010: 2; Ruist, 2014: 21) . Together, the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 implied an enormous increase in the institutional, economic and social heterogeneity of the Union (Hemerijck, 2013: 290; Höpner and Schäfer, 2012: 436-437), leading to a resurgence of nationalist and welfare chauvinist sentiments in the old member states (Hemerijck, 2013: 320; Hjorth, 2016) .
Governing politicians have also sounded their concerns with increasing volume. In
April 2013, the ministers of the interior from Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and the UK sent a joint letter to the Council of the European Union stating the view that free movement of persons and access to welfare should not be unconditional.
Together with Denmark, these member states have since 2013 pushed for the European Commission to propose more restrictive rules on access to EU cross-border welfare. In particular, concerns about more immediate access to welfare have been expressed, where EU immigrants after a short period of residence and/or work would be granted benefits before having earned their way into the system. The politicization of the free movement and welfare state nexus recently came to an extreme with the UK referendum on EU membership. Free movement of persons and 'welfare tourism' were main themes in the political debate and according to Reenan among the most important reasons for the UK exit decision (Reenen, 2016) . In sum, constitutive EU principles are increasingly contested, and with the results of the UK referendum, the very fundament of the Union itself is indeed shattered. More member states may follow the UK exit path (Reenen, 2016) .
Thus, the assumption that immigration of EU citizens from other member states poses a net burden on the welfare state is widely stated. The assumption has considerable political implications, as it brings constitutive EU principles into question and regards them as unsustainable. Despite its wide and growing political implications for the European Union, few scholars 2 have addressed this 'welfare burden' thesis empirically. In this article, we investigate the fiscal impact of EU immigration on the Danish welfare state over a long time span to put the 'welfare burden' thesis to empirical test. Our purpose is to examine the extent to which EU immigrants 'pay their way in the welfare system' (Dustmann et al., 2010: 2) Below, we present the EU free movement rules and the right to cross-border welfare and argue why they can be regarded as rather exceptional rules, although the rights of EU citizens to equal treatment in terms of welfare are still conditioned. We then present the characteristics of the Danish universalistic, tax-based welfare state as unique in its own right, making it more likely to confirm the 'welfare burden' thesis.
The data of our study are subsequently presented, followed by analysis of the fiscal impact of EU immigration on the universalistic welfare state of Denmark. We examine the evolution of EU immigration to Denmark, its fiscal impact in aggregate and on average and by different components, namely, age, years since migration and country of origin. We conclude by rejecting the 'welfare burden' thesis on the basis of our findings. Even in a period of considerable structural change, EU immigrants made a significant positive net contribution to the Danish welfare state.
European Union exceptionalism: free movement and cross-border welfare
Compared to other advanced economies, the European Union's free movement principle for persons is exceptional indeed (Ruhs, 2015) . Since the adoption of the (Dougan, 2013: 133) .
The Court stated that if a certain link had been established between a citizen and a host member state, this could justify the right to welfare benefits.
However, whereas the Union rules mark a fundamental intervention into the national prerogative to define the members of social communities (Cornelissen, 1996; Ferrera, 2005 United Kingdom (C-308/14) clearly depart from the earlier, expansive interpretations of the Court. These cases are, however, ruled after the period analysed in this article and thus do not affect the fiscal impact study conducted below.
In sum, European citizens are equal, but some European citizens are more equal than others. EU rules on free movement within the Union and cross-border welfare remain exceptional compared to other immigration policies, but they are not unconditional.
Free movement and the universalistic welfare state
Like the other Nordic welfare states, the Danish welfare state is often presented as distinct. It is characterized as universalist, largely de-commodified, residence-based, non-contributory and relatively generous (Cox, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ruhs, 2015) . First, the Danish welfare state has traditionally been characterized as universalist, promoting equality of status among its citizens. In the Scandinavian systems of universalism, the needy is not distinguished from the non-needy. Welfare universalism benefits the middle class and the poor because most benefits are available to all citizens. Social policies are not targeted to low-income groups as in the residual welfare state, and they are not dependent on labour market participation as in the insurance-based welfare state. Second, according to Esping-Andersen's famous welfare worlds, a key feature of the Nordic model is the high degree of 'decommodified' welfare rights. A de-commodified welfare state will thus grant social rights on the basis of citizenship or residence rather than on the basis of market performance, i.e. attachment to the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Third, social rights are granted on the basis of residence (Cornelissen, 1996) . A person is entitled to welfare because s/he is a citizen or a habitual resident, not qua individual contributions paid to a specific scheme. Fourth, benefits have traditionally been tax-financed. However, tax payment is not a direct requirement to receive a specific social benefit. The Scandinavian welfare state has thus traditionally had an institutionalized principle of equal treatment for the members of its welfare communities. Finally, the Scandinavian model has also been characterized by relatively generous benefits and extensive welfare services (Lindbom, 2001 ).
Because of these characteristics, the Danish welfare state has been viewed as 'unfit'
for Union rules where EU citizens have a right to reside and access welfare across borders. Its universalistic, relatively de-commodified and generous nature should make it particularly attractive to EU immigrants. Furthermore, its residence and noncontributory character would make it vulnerable in a community of open welfare borders because the organizing logic of the system does not ensure that those who benefit also contribute (Scharpf, 2002 (Scharpf, , 2010 . Basically, this type of welfare state is found to be out of tune in its current institutional set-up but also for historical reasons. When the cross-border welfare rules were originally designed, the six founding members all had insurance-based welfare systems. The community rules came to match this insurance-based logic. Welfare rights were to be granted according to where one works, i.e. according to the 'lex loci laboris' principle and where one paid into the social security scheme (Christensen and Malmstedt, 2000; Cornelissen, 1996) . This would ensure a balance between contributions paid and benefits received. This contrasts with the residence-based and non-contributory welfare state, which compared to the other member states has been perceived as most exposed to the rationale of EU cross-border welfare and, as a distinct welfare state within an exceptional system, more vulnerable (Martinsen, 2005) .
The Danish welfare state is thus a most likely or crucial case to examine core claims of the 'welfare burden' thesis (for the logic behind most likely or crucial cases and its strong ability to serve as empirical theory testing, see George and Bennett, 2005, Gerring, 2007) . We identify at least three core claims that should be considered for empirical test:
1) The EU free movement and cross-border welfare rules are more likely to pose a burden on more inclusive and generous welfare states.
2) EU immigrants from the new member states are more likely to be net burdens to the host welfare state than EU immigrants from the old member states, as their wage levels will be low, and they will contribute less to the public purse.
3) EU immigrants with short-term residence are more likely to be net burdens to the host welfare state than EU immigrants with longer term residence, as they may benefit from the system before they have earned their way into it.
Data
Our research design has common features with the recent literature on EU fiscal impact assessment. We adopt a static approach over a long period of time, as Dustmann and Frattini (2014) programmes. In addition, our data allow us to identify the individual use of the healthcare sector: consultation by a general practitioner or dentist and hospitalization.
Finally, criminal charges against EU immigrants are also identifiable in our dataset.
It should be noted that our estimate of criminality costs can be considered as an Concerning public goods, the ideal would be to calculate the marginal costs for providing public goods for each arriving immigrant (see Dustmann and Frattini, 2014 : 599 for their considerations on using marginal versus average cost of public goods). However, no data are available for the marginal costs of providing public goods to immigrants. We therefore calculated the average costs of public goods, i.e.
the ratio of total expenditures for public goods to the total population. 8 The public goods' costs cover a long list of items, including costs for legislative and administrative institutions, fiscal affairs, external affairs, defence, transport and infrastructure maintenance, fire protection, public order and safety, waste management, environmental protection, etc. Many of the items are 'pure' public goods in the sense that costs are fixed irrespective of the size of the population. The average costs of public goods are therefore likely to overestimate the actual costs implied by the EU immigrant. In our analysis below, we therefore generally hold the marginal cost of public goods equal to zero but add a lower bound calculation of the average fiscal impact where the marginal cost of public goods is equal to the average cost (see Figure 2c below).
For the examination of the net fiscal contribution for different populations of EU citizens in Denmark, this is obtained by the difference in means between contributions and expenditures. In this way, we can examine the extent to which EU immigrants in Denmark 'pay their way' in the welfare system (Dustmann et al., 2010 : 2) over a long period of time.
Finally, it should be noted that we have not been able to take into account the contribution of EU citizens to corporate tax in Denmark, a feature that can underestimate the total contribution of EU citizens to the Danish welfare system.
EU Immigration to Denmark 2002-2013
We define an EU immigrant as an individual residing in Denmark in the observation year with citizenship from a country member of the EU on 31 December of the observation year, irrespective of the year of arrival or length of migration. In Figure   1 , we report graphically the population of EU immigrants in Denmark during the years between 2002 and 2013 by different individual characteristics. In this period, the number of EU citizens in Denmark increased considerably from 53,782 to 159,857 people (see Figure 1a) . Over the 12-year timespan, EU citizens residing in Denmark increased by approximately 146%. However, this important increase in EU immigration to Denmark is not equally distributed across different age groups (Figure 1b) . 9 Notably, the group of EU immigrants aged between 25 and 44 has grown at a much faster pace than the remaining age groups, such that the age distribution of EU immigrants in Denmark is increasingly concentrated in this young worker age group, with the other age groups following similar trends. The groups of retired EU immigrants and children are the smallest. These are also the groups with potentially the most negative impact on the fiscal contribution of EU citizens. Figure   1c plots the evolution of the population of immigrants from old EU countries and from new EU countries. This plot clearly shows that in the future, the number of EU citizens from the new member states will outnumber the more traditional population of EU immigrants. Ultimo 2013, the five main states of origin for EU citizens in Denmark were Poland, Romania, Sweden, Germany and the UK. Finally, Figure 1d shows the evolution of temporary (under three years since migration) and more permanent EU immigrants (at least three years since migration). This plot reveals that both groups are growing at a similar pace and that the stock of temporary immigrants is more sensitive to the business cycle. To sum up, over the examined time span, we see an important increase in the number of EU immigrants in Denmark, changing the EU immigration pattern towards an immigrant population that increasingly originates in the new member states and is concentrated at a younger working age. and are less frequent users of the health care sector than EU citizens with longer term residence, i.e. more than three years in Denmark. We thus see that 'social integration', here conceptualized as the extent to which the welfare system is used, is weaker for EU citizens with shorter-term residence.
Fiscal impact of EU citizens in Denmark between 2002 and 2013
We computed the fiscal impact of EU citizens by directly ascribing individuals their public transfer and estimated cost for each public service and their contribution to each of the revenue sources in the dataset. This allows us to calculate for each year overall net fiscal impact of the 100% of population of EU citizens registered in Denmark. The fiscal impact is attained by calculating the difference in contributions and expenditures (for similar methods, see Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; Ruist, 2014) . Below, Figure We now turn our focus to the different contributions of temporary, e.g. immigrants with residence under three years, and those with longer residence in Denmark, e.g. more than three years of residence. Figure 3 demonstrates that both groups of EU citizens have a positive contribution to Danish welfare. However, the contribution of EU citizens with shorter term residence in Denmark is on average €4000 lower than that of immigrants with more years in Denmark. Nevertheless, the consumption of public income and services of more recently arrived EU citizens is also much lower.
When comparing citizens from old versus new member states, Figure 3 shows that citizens from old member states contribute more but also benefit more, i.e. social expenditures are higher. The aggregated fiscal impact from the two groups of countries are positive for both throughout the examined period but, as also shown by Dustmann and Frattini (2014) and Ruist (2014) , the net fiscal contribution is higher from EU citizens from old member states than from new member states. 
Conclusion
The EU rules on free movement of people and the right to cross-border welfare are increasingly contested. The nexus between EU immigration and the welfare state became high politics in the UK referendum and has cast the EU into its worst crisis ever. The assumption that EU immigrants pose a net burden on the hosting welfare system has sounded loud and wide in recent years. The relationship between free movement rules and the welfare state is one of the most salient debates in current EU politics. The 'welfare burden' thesis has been the core of this debate. Its recurrent articulation calls for an empirical test, which has been the research endeavour of this paper.
In this article, we have examined the fiscal impact of EU immigration on the universalistic, tax-financed welfare state of Denmark. In the rather exceptional system of EU free movement for persons and cross-border welfare, Denmark constitutes a crucial case for examining whether EU immigrants are net burdens on a welfare state with the largest share of non-contributory social benefits, among other key characteristics.
The main contribution of this study has been an empirical inquiry into a solid claim with wide and growing political implications on the basis of a unique dataset, a long time span and for a 100% of the EU citizens residing in Denmark. The main conclusion is that even in this type of presumably exposed welfare state -and even during a time span of considerable structural changes -EU immigrants made a significant positive net contribution to the Danish welfare state. We thus reject the 'welfare burden' thesis for the universalistic, tax-financed welfare state of Denmark. Not only have EU citizens paid their way into the welfare system, but they have also made a considerable contribution to its fiscal sustainability through tax payment. The 'welfare burden' thesis disregards that inclusive, generous welfare states also oblige their residents to pay high taxes. Also disregarded is that EU rules permit member states to condition residence rights on EU immigrants not being an 'unreasonable burden' on the social assistance system of a host state.
During the 12-year time span examined, the EU immigration pattern in Denmark changed substantively, but reliance on welfare remained rather stable. (Dustmann et al., 2010) . EU8 immigrants made higher direct and indirect tax contribution, and they claimed less public benefits and services than similar UK citizens. In their 2014 paper, Dustmann and provision is calculated by dividing the total costs of public goods provision in the given year with the total population size in the same year.
9. The Online appendix presents the age distribution of EU citizens during the last 5 years of our sample, disaggregated by country of origin. As in the Swedish case (Ruist, 2014) , immigrants from new EU countries are more concentrated in the younger working age group than immigrants from old EU countries, and both groups are much more heavily concentrated for the EU population than the population with Danish citizenship. 10 The Online appendix reports the amount per year in €2013 for the full EU population and for the different groups considered in this article.
